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The Tory Anarchism of F/OSS Licensing
David McGowant
This Article uses the example of free and open-source software licenses to show
that granting authors relatively strong control over the modification of their work can
increase rather than impede both the creation of future work and the variety of that
work. Such licenses show that form agreements that enable authors to condition use of
their work on the terms that matter most to them may give authors the incentive and
assurance they need to produce work and make it available to others. Such licenses may
therefore increase both the amount of expression available for use and the variety of
that expression, even if enforcement limits the freedom of downstream users. These
facts give reason to oppose recent decisions that make license terms harder to enforce
through preliminary or permanent injunctive relief.
INTRODUCTION
Among their other virtues, free and open-source software licenses
(F/OSS licenses) annoy almost everyone. The licenses cause academic
knees to jerk in different directions. They are "take it or leave it" forms
that in some cases seek to extend the influence of an author through
several levels of future production, which most scholars think is bad,'
but they do so in the name of "openness" (as opposed to proprietary
"closed" code), which most scholars think is good.2 The licenses worry
in-house counsel, who rightly believe that their engineers or overseas
contractors might include licensed code in a product without document-
ing that fact. The licenses befuddle many practicing lawyers.
Such annoyances are often valuable. They may force more care-
ful thinking about things too often taken for granted, and careful
thought may reveal holes in arguments once considered tightly knit.
In this Article, I want to use the example of F/OSS licenses to shed
light on two topics: (1) whether such licenses should be considered
contracts or simple conditional permissions to use intellectual prop-
erty, and (2) whether as a presumptive matter they should be en-
forced through injunctive relief rather than damages.
t Lyle L. Jones Professor of Competition and Innovation Law, University of San Diego
School of Law.
1 See, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S Cal
L Rev 1239, 1279-82 (1995), citing Vault Corp v Quaid Software Ltd, 847 F2d 255 (5th Cir 1988).
2 See, for example, Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Ortho-
doxy of "Rights Management," 97 Mich L Rev 462, 530 & n 258 (1998).
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On each topic, I argue in favor of allowing authors maximum
freedom to tailor the conditions under which they make their work
available to the public. I argue that it does not matter very much
whether judges treat the licenses as contracts or conditional permis-
sions so long as judges do not use contractual treatment to weaken
remedies for violations of the license terms. I argue as well in favor of
presumptive injunctive relief and against the current trend of cases
reading eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC' to weaken the presumption
of irreparable harm in copyright cases.
More generally, I contend that the arguments that support these
positions tend to refute the dominant strain of academic thought con-
cerning copyright law and licensing, which holds that injunctive relief
and licensor conditions are opposed to innovation and, in a somewhat
diffuse sense, to freedom. Just the opposite is more likely true. Apart
from the unusual case of monopoly (in which case all solutions are
imperfect) or fraud, courts will tend to enhance freedom and creativ-
ity by enforcing conditions licensors impose on the use of their works
and, presumptively, enjoining violations of those conditions. Such en-
forcement empowers licensors to undertake new projects on which
they might not otherwise be willing to work. It does not limit the free-
dom of those who prefer not to assert their rights; they remain free
not to do so.
Following George Orwell's description of Jonathan Swift, I refer
to this approach as "Tory anarchism."' It is Tory in the sense that it
affirms the traditional preference for injunctive relief for infringement
of intellectual property rights; it is anarchistic in the sense that the
relative centralization of control in authors produces a varied and ro-
bust expressive environment that is, I argue, richer than would be the
case with alternative approaches.
I. WHY F/OSS LICENSES ARE INTERESTING
F/OSS licenses are forms that set forth a software author's view
of what those who use the code may do and, in certain circumstances,
must do.' Two aspects of this definition are worth elaborating.
F/OSS licenses are forms, but unlike many forms they are used
by licensors with widely varying interests working in widely varying
3 547 US 388 (2006).
4 See Part III.
5 For a discussion of other common types and features of F/OSS licenses, see Timothy K.
Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the
Benefit of the Public, 47 Harv J Legis 359, 369-87 (2010).
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contexts. An example of varied interests might be the requirement
typical of F/OSS licenses that a downstream author who distributes
modified code identify her modifications and give credit to previous
authors. Some authors might value such credit a great deal and want
to secure it as a means of enhancing their professional reputations.
Others might not care much about being named, wanting only to be
sure they are not blamed or praised for code they did not write.
As to varying contexts, a F/OSS license may be one element of a
for-profit business model, in which the licensor earns money from
products or services that complement the licensed code. The same
license may be used by a hobbyist project whose contributors have no
interest in leveraging profits from the code. The GNU/Linux operat-
ing system and the Java Model Railroad Interface (JMRI) both use
the GNU General Public License (GPL). But many firms that pro-
mote GNU/Linux do so to make money selling complementary serv-
ices, while JMRI is a true hobbyist project whose members have no
commercial aspirations for their code.' The form itself therefore says
less about the contexts in which it is used than do other, more tar-
geted forms such as parking or travel tickets or shipping forms.
Data on license use are consistent with this intuition. A leading
open-source consultancy reports that nearly half of the projects it sur-
veyed use version 2.0 of the General Public License (GPL 2). The sur-
vey included more than 230,000 projects, and it seems unlikely that the
leaders of each of the roughly 110,000 projects that adopted GPL 2
made a considered determination that GPL 2 fit their projects better
than any of the numerous other F/OSS licenses available for adoption.!
Because F/OSS licenses are forms used by very different authors
in very different contexts, it is inevitably misleading to make general
6 See, for example, Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source,
50 J Indust Econ 197, 203 (2002).
7 Disclosure: Following the district court's second denial of a motion for preliminary
injunction, after remand from the Federal Circuit, I assisted Victoria Hall in the representation
of Robert Jacobsen, the leader of the JMRI project, in Jacobsen v Katzer, No 3:06-cv-1905 (ND
Cal filed Mar 13, 2006). The case settled on terms including a permanent injunction. See Stipu-
lated Permanent Injunction, Jacobsen v Katzer, No 3:06-cv-1905 (ND Cal Feb 22, 2010), online
at http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/403.pdf (visited Jan 31, 2011).
8 For a list detailing the data on license use, see Black Duck Open Source Resource Cen-
ter, Top 20 Most Commonly Used Licenses in Open Source Projects, online at
http://www.blackducksoftware.com/oss/licenses#top20 (visited Oct 12, 2010) (showing that al-
most 50 percent of open-source projects used GPL 2). The Berkeley Software Distribution
(BSD) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) licenses, which were published shortly
before GPL 2, combine to account for an additional 10 percent of projects, suggesting either a
form of path dependence owing to familiarity and experience with the licenses or a desire to use
the license to signal certain project characteristics-or both. Id.
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statements about what "open-source" licensing is or is not about. The
most famous project, the GNU/Linux operating system, receives signif-
icant commercial support from firms whose business models would
benefit from a relatively inexpensive operating system.9 Other projects
using the same license draw no commercial attention at all. But precise-
ly because such a broad range of authors working in such different con-
texts find these forms useful, the forms provide unique insights into the
relationship between copyright, licensing, and the production of expres-
sion. Whatever one might say about F/OSS forms such as GPL 2, they
cannot plausibly be dismissed as reflecting a bias toward any particular
type of author (corporate or individual, for-profit or nonprofit) or type
of use (passive or transformative). It therefore makes sense to examine
the structure of the licenses and the sociology of production they sus-
tain to gain insights into this relationship.
The second interesting part of my definition is the deliberately
vague phrase "the author's view." The phrase avoids taking a position
on a debate over how the law should classify F/OSS licenses. Some
scholars, most recently Robert A. Hillman and Maureen O'Rourke,
believe the licenses should be classified as contracts."o Others, such as
Eben Moglen, the scholar with by far the most experience with the
most commonly used licenses, prefer to characterize them as condi-
tional permissions to use code."
I prefer the conditional permission construction of at least the
GPL, and I argue for that construction below.12 In doing so, however, I
do not want to give the impression that this distinction has any intrin-
sic importance. It does not. It matters only to the extent courts might
be tempted to use the contract label to make it harder for licensors to
enjoin violations of the license terms.
The F/OSS licenses of which I am aware all allow users to run
code on their computers free from any obligation. At the basic level of
running programs, therefore, it is hard to tease a bargain out of the
licenses because they require nothing of the user.
9 For a list of Linux Foundation members, see Members, online at
http://www.linuxfoundation.orglabout/members (visited Oct 12, 2010).
1o See Robert A. Hillman and Maureen A. O'Rourke, Rethinking Consideration in the
Electronic Age, 61 Hastings L J 311, 328-31 (2009).
11 See, for example, Eben Moglen, Enforcing the GNU GPL (GNU Sept 10, 2001), online at
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/enforcing-gpl.html (visited Oct 13, 2010) ("Licenses are not con-
tracts: the work's user is obliged to remain within the bounds of the license not because she volun-
tarily promised, but because she doesn't have any right to act at all except as the license permits.").
12 See text accompanying notes 15-22.
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The licenses do require users to do something if they modify and
distribute code. The obligations run from mild and undemanding,
such as the requirement of the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD)
and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) licenses that a de-
rivative author include a copyright notice acknowledging the original
work," or the requirement of the Artistic License that the derivative
author provide source code for the modified work and the means to
obtain the original work, to the famous "copyleft" requirement of the
GPL, which requires a derivative author to distribute the derivative
work under the same license governing his own use of the code."
How many users of any given program released under any given
license actually modify code and distribute modified versions is, of
course, an empirical question. I note here only that there is no reason
to expect the numbers to be uniform across licenses or even across
projects using the same license, and there is no reason to believe that
most users or even a large fraction of users actually subject themselves
to these requirements. It is my impression, though no more than that,
that many users of most programs fall into one of two categories.
They either receive code and run it without modification or modify it
for distribution within a firm but do not release the modifications
more generally. Such limited distribution probably does not violate
the "copyleft" requirement, and the modifications probably are treat-
ed, unproblematically, as trade secrets.
The example of nondistributing users makes it a stretch to treat
F/OSS licenses as contracts unless the facts of a particular case show
that the parties intended to use a F/OSS form to document an agree-
ment. Professors Hillman and O'Rourke suggest that a licensor's
"motive to further one or more of" the goals of the F/OSS movement,
"without more, should be sufficient to satisfy the bargain require-
ment."" I find this argument unpersuasive, because altruism on the
part of the licensor establishes no obligation on the part of the licensee.
I agree that a licensor's general desire for increased adoption of F/OSS
code and development practices could count as a benefit to the licensor,
though one more general and diffuse than is found in the textbook cas-
es in which courts stretch the concept of consideration to enforce what
13 See Open Source Initiative, The BSD License, online at http://www.opensource.org/
licenses/bsd-license.php (visited Oct 13, 2010); Open Source Initiative, The MIT License, online
at http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php (visited Oct 13, 2010).
14 For a summary of these terms, see David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source
Software, 2001 U Ill L Rev 241, 253-57.
15 Hillman and O'Rourke, 61 Hastings L J at 328-39 (cited in note 10).
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probably were gifts," but no licensee is obliged in any way to contrib-
ute to these goals. A licensee who runs the code contributes to the
base of users and thus may make the code more attractive to devel-
opers of complementary code or services, but no licensee has to run
the code and nothing stops a licensee from trying it, throwing it away,
and disparaging both the project that developed it and F/OSS devel-
opment more generally.17
For essentially the same reason, I do not think Hillman and
O'Rourke refute the notion that most F/OSS licenses are best read as
simple conditional permissions to use code. Hillman and O'Rourke
draw an analogy to a conditional permission to visit land, where the
condition limits the visitor's future use of knowledge gained during
the visit. They see this as a bargain in which the visitor's agreement to
the limitation is consideration running to the landowner." But for
many F/OSS users, this analogy gets things backward. Unlike visitors
to land who will venture back out into the world and must restrain
themselves according to the terms of the license from doing things
that otherwise might come naturally to them, many F/OSS users simp-
ly get the code, install it on their machines, and never return it to the
larger world. They do not have to restrict themselves from doing any-
thing. Conceptually, they agree not to distribute modified versions
without complying with the license conditions, but if they have no de-
sire or capacity to do so, then this restriction is purely theoretical; the
author faces no real possibility of either harm or tangible benefit from
such use.
In Jacobsen v Katzer," the Federal Circuit did use the language of
contract to describe the Artistic License,' but I think the court's lan-
guage should not be read literally. The court noted that in general
F/OSS communities emphasize collaboration, and it wrote that in "ex-
change and in consideration for this collaborative work, the copyright
holder permits users to copy, modify and distribute the software code
subject to conditions that serve to protect downstream users and to
keep the code accessible."21
16 See, for example, Hamer v Sidway, 27 NE 256, 258 (NY 1891).
17 At points Hillman and O'Rourke seem to have in mind benefits such as status or reputa-
tional gains that developers may enjoy from having their work included in a prominent project.
See Hillman and O'Rourke, 61 Hastings L J at 328-29 (cited in note 10). But no project main-
tainer need include any particular contribution in a program.
18 Id.
19 535 F3d 1373 (Fed Cir 2008).
20 Id at 1379-82.
21 Id at 1379.
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The court's description works as an idealized vision of a F/OSS
project, but, as noted above, no exchange is required for many and per-
haps most users of code produced by many and perhaps most projects.
The court also noted possible reputational benefits for developers,'
which comes closer to a conventional bargain situation, but even a de-
sire to gain a reputation imposes no reciprocal user obligation to read
credits files or do anything else. Jacobsen therefore points to general
descriptions of aspirations and probabilities that may be relevant in
some cases but that cannot be presumed to exist as concrete fact in
any particular case-and in all likelihood are not present in any seri-
ous way in a large fraction of cases. And it is the facts of particular
situations, not generalities about uncertain probabilities, that should
matter for purposes of formation analysis.
II. WHY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS IMPORTANT TO F/OSS LICENSING
Regardless of one's view of the contract-permission distinction,
remedies matter to F/OSS licensing. They do not necessarily matter
more to authors using F/OSS licenses than to authors using more con-
ventional proprietary documents, but in some cases the structure of
F/OSS production makes it easier to see what is at stake in deciding
whether to enjoin violations of license terms or simply to price them
through litigation. In both F/OSS and more conventional proprietary
licensing, licenses both govern use and sustain expectations that allow
authors to produce works in many different ways. Violations of those
terms can cause harm that is either hard to count in dollar terms or for
which authors would not count money as adequate payment.
As a practical matter, until recently remedies for breach of a license
term differed depending on whether the term was considered a limita-
tion on the scope of use or a promise. As the Federal Circuit put it in
Jacobsen (applying Ninth Circuit law), "if the terms of the Artistic Li-
cense allegedly violated are both covenants and conditions, they may
serve to limit the scope of the license and are governed by copyright law.
If they are merely covenants, by contrast, they are governed by contract
law."2 The Artistic License stated that the content it covered could be
used and modified "provided that" its terms were met, and the court
found that this language stated a condition rather than a covenant.24
22 Id.
2 535 F3d at 1380.
24 Id at 1382.
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For this distinction, Jacobsen relied on Sun Microsystems, Inc v
Microsoft Corp,' where the Ninth Circuit addressed a license from
Sun that allowed Microsoft to make and distribute products embody-
ing Sun's Java technology.26 The license required that Microsoft's
products be compatible with the most recent versions of Java. The
question was whether this term was a promise by Microsoft to Sun or
a limitation on Microsoft's right to use Sun's technology.
The court held that this distinction mattered because in seeking a
preliminary injunction a copyright licensor was entitled to a presump-
tion of irreparable harm
only after the copyright holder has established that the disputed
terms are limitations on the scope of the license rather than inde-
pendent contractual covenants. In other words, before [a plain-
tiff] can gain the benefits of copyright enforcement, it must defin-
itively establish that the rights it claims were violated are cop-
yright, not contractual, rights.'
By its terms, Sun Microsystems pertains only to the presumption
of irreparable harm enjoyed (when Sun Microsystems was decided) by
copyright plaintiffs who show they are likely to prevail on the merits
of their claims." This aspect of Sun Microsystems may be moot in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, which held that permanent
injunctive relief in patent cases may issue only if a plaintiff shows it
would be irreparably harmed without such relief." Most commenta-
tors and lower courts read eBay as extending to all forms of injunctive
relief, including preliminary injunctions in copyright cases.'
Setting the eBay decision aside for a moment, the Sun Microsys-
tems court's distinction is useful in only a limited set of cases. The dis-
tinction traces to Peer International Corp v Pausa Records, Inc," which
held that the defendant's failure to pay royalties during a license term
25 188 F3d 1115 (9th Cir 1999).
26 Id at 1118.
27 Id at 1121-22.
28 See id at 1119.
29 eBay, 547 US at 391-92 (rejecting a rule that grants injunctive relief when only in-
fringement has been shown and requiring plaintiffs asserting patent infringement to show four
elements, including irreparable harm).
30 See, for example, Salinger v Colting, 607 F3d 68, 77-78 (2d Cir 2010); Pamela Samuelson
and Krzysztof Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove Irreparable Harm in Copyright
Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 I/S: J L & Pol Info Socy 67, 72-74 (2010). For an exception, see
Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc v Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co, 571 F3d 873, 877 (9th Cir 2009) (ap-
plying a presumption of irreparable harm in a trademark case).
31 909 F2d 1332 (9th Cir 1990).
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did not give rise to an infringement action." The plaintiff sought to
frame the claim as one for infringement in order to claim statutory
damages, which exceeded the royalty payments called for by the li-
cense and which were themselves specified as part of a statutory com-
pulsory license. The court held that claims for unpaid royalties were
contract claims rather than infringement claims."
The court's holding makes sense because the plaintiff had agreed
to exchange exclusivity for a determinate amount of money, and no
policy would be served by awarding more than that amount.' In con-
trast, had the defendant exceeded the scope of the license, it could
have created harm that would be hard to value or that the plaintiff
would not treat as simply a monetary loss. In this regard, it is worth
noting that even with respect to the unpaid royalties claim the court
noted that the defendant's breach could support a claim for rescis-
sion," in which case an infringement claim presumably would lie for a
defendant's post-rescission exercise of exclusive rights.
Apart from such royalty disputes, practical considerations coun-
sel in favor of treating material breaches as supporting claims for in-
fringement. Contract law long ago adopted the doctrine of construc-
tive conditions of exchange precisely because most parties make
promises in the first place only because they expect the performance
promised in return." The doctrine determines whether the victim of
the breach must tender her own performance or whether she may re-
fuse to do so and terminate the agreement." Where a breach is mate-
rial (an inquiry that asks in part whether the victim of the breach is
likely to suffer harm for which she cannot be compensated ade-
quately), a party is entitled to treat the contract as terminated and is
not required to tender its own performance.
Contrary to the implications of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Sun
Microsystems was just such a case. Microsoft's refusal to develop com-
pliant Java would deny Sun the benefit of propagating its technology as
32 Id at 1338-39.
33 Id.
34 The license terms varied the statutory compulsory license terms, but the point in the text
is reinforced by the statutory scheme, which reflects a policy determination regarding the license
fee in addition to whatever terms the parties might reach.
35 See Peer International, 909 F2d at 1339 n 9 (noting the availability of both a cause of
action for breach of contract and a cause of action for rescission).
36 See Catherine M.A. McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 32.2 at 134-36 (Lexis rev ed
1999). Consider, for example, Jones v Barkley, 99 Eng Rep 434, 437-40 (KB 1781).
37 See, for example, Jones, 99 Eng Rep at 437-40; Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§§ 237, 241 (1979).
38 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241.
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a de facto standard -precisely the benefit Sun sought by entering into a
licensing program in the first place." Similarly, the comparatively few
obligations placed on F/OSS licensees-recognition for work done and,
in some cases, propagation of the production model through the
"copyleft" provision-are likely to be important to the licensor. Why
would an author agree to distribute works under a F/OSS license if a
judge were likely to award only damages rather than injunctive relief,
where damages would likely be low or nonexistent given the ability of
numerous downstream users to distribute code for free? There is no
point in making the author's remedies turn on whether the language of
an agreement strikes a judge as more like a promise or a condition. In
my view, Jacobsen reaches the right result on such analysis, but con-
strained by Sun Microsystems as precedent, it had to take the wrong
approach to get there.
As I mentioned earlier, the difference between promises and
conditions is important only to the extent it affects the remedies
courts will grant for violation of a license's terms. One strand of aca-
demic criticism embraces this difference, arguing in essence that if an
author distributes code under a contract then the author should be
limited to contractual remedies.' The default contractual remedy is
expectation damages, with specific performance or prohibitory injunc-
tive relief being the exception rather than the rule.41 The difference
between promises and conditions therefore points directly to the fa-
miliar debate over property rules and liability rules. Enough has been
written on that debate, to say the least, but the case of F/OSS licenses
highlights some interesting aspects of it. In my view, the F/OSS exam-
ple shows why the traditional preference for injunctive relief in copy-
right cases is correct and why the Supreme Court has been wrong to
lead lower courts away from that presumption.42
39 See Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Com-
petitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 Antitrust Bull 715, 764-65 (1998) (addressing
Sun's concern that Windows's modifications to Java would prevent its adoption as a standard).
4o Unfortunately, I have not found the argument made in a published work. For an exam-
ple of the argument in summary form in a podcast, see Panel Discussion, Liability for Intermedi-
aries under Copyright and Trademark Law (Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting, Jan 10, 2009) (statements of Mike Madison and Mark Lemley), online at
http://www.aalsweb.org/frilLawandComputers.mp3 (visited Oct 9, 2010).
41 Compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 (stating that "the injured party has a
right to damages based on his expectation interest") with Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 357 (stating that "specific performance of a contract duty will be granted in the discretion of
the court").
42 For commentary on the tradition of injunctive relief in copyright cases, see H. Toms
G6mez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us about Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-
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Hobbyist projects present the easiest illustration of my argument.
Take a project such as JMRI." The project authors do not charge for
their code, so their monetary expectation damages are $0. They might
suffer harm from infringement that could in theory be monetized, such
as lost reputational gains, but in many cases such losses would be highly
speculative and impossible to quantify with any precision. JMRI is a
hobbyist project; the authors have day jobs, often not programming for
model railroads. (The project leader is a physicist at UC Berkeley.)
The authors might suffer other forms of harm, however, for which
expectation damages would be particularly ill suited to compensate. For
example, there is no obvious way to calculate expectation damages suf-
ficient to compensate Howard Penny, a JMRI author who gave the fol-
lowing testimony at his deposition regarding his view of the infringe-
ment alleged (and found on summary judgment) in Jacobsen:
[G]ranted, the JMRI project being open source, anybody can
look at it and use it and modify it, but they're supposed to give
credit to those people who-who did it. And if I'm not going to
get credit for what I did, then I would have to cease my contribu-
tions, because there really was a lot of effort in this.
I have not contributed anything in quite some time.
Q. And why is that?
A. Well, because it's very discouraging to find it being used by
others that are not giving credit for it."
One could translate this statement into reputational-capital terms
and subject it to a notional totting up of costs and benefits that would
make expectation damages seem appealing. By extension, such transla-
tion would make liability rules seem appealing too. But what would be
the point of such pretend pricing? The author expresses frustration at the
defendant's lack of acknowledgment of his work as much as, if not more
than, he expresses frustration at not being recognized in a sense that
Law Requirement, 81 S Cal L Rev 1197, 1205-06 (2008) (discussing lower court responses to the
Supreme Court's eBay decision before conducting a comprehensive historical analysis of injunc-
tive relief since the sixteenth century). For a more general argument regarding irreparable harm,
see David McGowan, Irreparable Harm, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev 577, 584-95 (2010) (arguing
that infringement cases should be afforded the presumption of irreparable harm because of the
unique monetary and nonmonetary aspects of intellectual property).
43 See disclosure in note 7.
44 See Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Jacobsen v Katzer,
No 3:06-cv-1905, *15 (ND Cal filed Nov 13,2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 5162171).
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would enhance his reputation. Such sentiments count in any genuine util-
itarian calculation even though they cannot be quantified and netted
against offsetting considerations with anything approaching precision.
The hobbyist case may seem unusual because hobbyists do not
presumptively maximize revenue, but I believe the hobbyist case con-
tains important lessons that extend even to more conventional cases.
These lessons argue in favor of presumptive injunctive relief for copy-
right infringement-precisely the position lower courts are abandon-
ing in the wake of eBay.
The basic lesson is that most of the time it is costly and difficult for
third parties to calculate the value of things that are not already priced
by the parties themselves, as in Jacobsen, or, alternatively, that parties
have priced only in connection with limitations that they have specified
themselves, as in Sun Microsystems. Even seemingly straightforward
technology, such as Sun's Java, may face unusual risks, such as the risk
of fragmentation if competitors are allowed to produce variations of the
technology. Similarly, restrictions on the field in which a technology
may be used may facilitate price discrimination or shield a licensor from
competition in a market segment. In either case, it may be very hard to
determine what the licensor's profits would have been if the term had
been enforced through injunctive relief.'
To allow those limitations to be breached on payment of expecta-
tion damages introduces judicial rate-setting in the near term and cre-
ates the risk that parties eventually will take costly measures to avoid
putting themselves at the mercy of such rate-setting in the future. (No
sane, much less rational, party would willingly place itself at the mercy
of battling damages experts.) The shift from bargaining forced by
property rules to a take-and-pay-a-judicially-set-rate regime promises
increased costs and decreased accuracy in cases where payment is
made and, probably, a net decrease in cases where payment is made
owing to the increased costs of setting a price.
For this reason, the apparent trend away from either preliminary or
permanent injunctive relief is undesirable. In a static analysis, it is unde-
sirable if one presumes that in most cases license terms rule out behavior
likely to cause harm that is either hard to measure in monetary terms
45 The easiest case for expectation damages would be one in which a field-of-use re-
striction reserved to the licensor a field in which it held a monopoly position. On this assump-
tion, one might suppose that the licensor could be confident that sales made to an infringer
represented lost profits to the licensor. That is a good argument, but if the entrant lowered its
price below the level charged by the licensor, then one would have to estimate whether sales
made at that price would have been made at the licensor's higher price.
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(lost sales to competitors) or that the licensor perceives in nonmone-
tary terms (the respect denied a JMRI programmer or the messages
or images conveyed by a copyrighted character and the social signifi-
cance of that character). Even if one takes the realist view that injunc-
tive relief is appropriate only to forestall irreparable harm (rather
than simply to safeguard an exclusive right), if the modal case involves
such harm, then courts are more likely to reach the right result most
efficiently by presuming harm rather than requiring a plaintiff to in-
troduce evidence of such harm.6
If I am wrong about the modal case, of course, then this point
cuts the other way. But there is reason to believe that some degree of
immeasurable or nonmonetizable harm is quite common. I have made
this point in the context of transformative uses of iconic works, which
can disrupt meanings valuable to some consumers and interfere with
the ability of some consumers to express aspects of their personalities
through association with a distinct character (or, for that matter,
trademark).47 Marginal reductions in commercial value would be hard
to measure, and for individual consumers many works are not about
48
money anyway.
46 In this respect, copyright mirrors the situation with regard to trespass to chattels, anoth-
er doctrine that has received extensive academic criticism unjustified by the cases or by complete
analysis. The defendant in the leading case, Intel Corp v Hamidi, 71 P3d 296 (Cal 2003) (holding
that injunctive relief is unavailable for a trespass to chattels claim unless a likelihood of irrepa-
rable harm is shown), was a former Intel employee who sent bulk unsolicited emails to current
Intel employees that criticized "Intel's employment practices, warned employees of the dangers
those practices posed to their careers, suggested employees consider moving to other compa-
nies," and recommended that employees visit Kourosh Hamidi's anti-Intel website. Id at 301.
Many employees asked the company to block the messages, and it is easy to imagine that Intel
incurred real losses in productivity as employees discussed Hamidi's claims and tried to deter-
mine whether they were true. Any effort to quantify such losses across over thirty thousand
employees seems to call for a great degree of speculation, but the losses are intuitive and almost
certainly real nonetheless. For fuller discussion of these points, see Richard A. Epstein, Intel v.
Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J L, Econ, & Pol 147, 151 (2005) (arguing that
Intel's losses were not trivial and that the availability of self-help and the inability to define
damages precisely should not preclude an injunctive remedy); David McGowan, The Trespass
Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J L, Econ, & Pol 109, 122-25 (2005) (analyzing the lan-
guage used in Intel to determine that the court used an erroneous analogy of the Internet to
physical land, which led the court to an unnecessarily restrained holding).
47 See David McGowan, Paradoxically Speaking *15-16 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper
No 08-077, Oct 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266835 (visited Oct 17, 2010); David
McGowan, Some Realism about the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 Fordham L Rev 435,
452-53 (2005).
48 See Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting "Irra-
tional Beliefs," 14 Geo Mason L Rev 605, 619-28 (2007) (arguing that consumers' intangible
benefit, obtained through psychological enjoyment of possession or gained status, is one of three
factors that determine the demand, sales, and price of goods). It may be that gains achieved
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Regardless of whether one accepts my empirical conjecture, a dy-
namic analysis also counsels in favor of the presumption of injunctive
relief more generally. Injunctive relief against violations of license
terms lowers the cost to an author of achieving the result the terms
are designed to achieve. It therefore lessens the author's incentive to
take costly measures in each case (access restrictions, letters of credit,
price increases, liquidated damage provisions) to guard against the
risk of an adverse result in a particular case.' Such measures may be
unlikely in the open-source context, but they are not out of the ques-
tion. It is easy to envision a project unable to secure injunctive relief
resorting to technical measures designed to block downloading by a
particular infringer while allowing comparatively free use of code by
(the majority of) users who comply with license terms.
III. WHY (RELATIVE) CENTRALIZATION OF CONTROL
MAY INCREASE BOTH THE PRODUCTION AND
DIVERSITY OF EXPRESSION
The "Tory anarchism" in this Article's title refers to a phrase
George Orwell used to describe his pre-socialist self,so and which he
later used to describe Jonathan Swift, whose literary example Orwell
tried to follow. According to Orwell, "[p]olitically, Swift was one of
those people who are driven into a sort of perverse Toryism by the fol-
lies of the progressive party of the moment."" Thus, Swift was "a Tory
anarchist, despising authority while disbelieving in liberty, and preserv-
ing the aristocratic outlook while seeing clearly that the existing aristoc-
racy is degenerate and contemptible."52 Orwell faulted Swift for partial
blindness: "He couldn't see what the simplest person sees, that life is
worth living and human beings, even if they're dirty and ridiculous, are
through transformation outweigh losses, so it seems plausible both to recognize that irreparable
harm is common and to oppose liability findings of any kind in such cases. I do not want to re-
hash that debate yet again here; my point is only that some harm tolerated under such a regime
likely would count as irreparable harm for purposes of injunctive relief if that harm were consid-
ered on its own.
4 This is just a particular example of the general argument that legal prohibitions on force
or fraud economize on self-help measures. See McGowan, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 588 (cited
in note 42) (comparing the relative efficiencies of injunctions and damages remedies).
50 See Bernard Crick, George Orwell: A Life 174 (Penguin 1980).
51 George Orwell, Politics vs. Literature: An Examination of Gulliver's Travels, in Sonia
Orwell and Ian Angus, eds, 4 The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell: In
Front of Your Nose 205, 207 (Secker & Warburg 1968).
52 Id at 216.
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mostly decent."" It is this aspect of Orwell's thinking I mean to invoke
by referring to Tory anarchism: a thread of optimism running through a
realistic and therefore often pessimistic fabric.
With respect to modern copyright debates, I use the term Tory
anarchism to point out that giving authors power to maintain control
of a work can increase, rather than diminish, both the variety and vol-
ume of work available to the public, at least in relation to alternative
legal regimes. The justification for this claim rests not on an abstract
devotion to "property" but on the observation that people seem to
like to order their affairs themselves and do so in a wide variety of
ways. This is no less true of people who coordinate to produce expres-
sion than of people who coordinate in any other way.
F/OSS licensing practices provide useful-if anecdotal-proof of
this claim. Even slight experience with F/OSS programming confirms
that people of widely varying dispositions and interests value the abil-
ity to create expressive communities by using the right to exclude as a
basis of organization. The part-time hobbyists of JMRI and many
more developers like them (to say nothing of those who utilize the
analogous methods of Creative Commons licensing for text) enhance
diversity of consumer choice and of methods of production, and they
do so without compensation or serious prospect of receiving compen-
sation. They use licenses for the purpose Karl Llewellyn identified as
the most important element of contracts (though the point may be
extended to conditional permissions, if one favors that view):
[T]he real major effect of law will be found not so much in the
cases in which law officials actually intervene, nor yet in those in
which such intervention is consciously contemplated as a possi-
bility, but rather in contributing to, strengthening, stiffening atti-
tudes toward performance as to what is to be expected and what
"is done."
Llewellyn's point is that social interactions rest on understand-
ings and expectations that both shape and are shaped by the law. Au-
thors who discover that the law will not presumptively, much less au-
tomatically, respect the conditions under which they provide access to
their works will take that legal fact into account in deciding whether
and how to construct their creations of expression. Those who find
53 George Orwell, Jonathan Swift, An Imaginary Interview, in W.J. West, ed, Orwell: The
War Broadcasts 112, 116 (DuckworthlBBC 1985).
5 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L J 704, 725
n 47 (1931).
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legal indifference to their wishes depressing, as Howard Penny did,"
are likely to stop production or shift to methods, such as restricted
access, more likely to give effect to their wishes. This example shows
that even if one despises the authorial authority embedded in proper-
ty rules and presumptive injunctive relief, it is naive to believe that
cutting back on such authority invariably yields net gains in anything.
It certainly does not produce inevitable net gains in "freedom" or
"liberty," because the freedom to take and use comes at the expense
of a freedom to structure production and distribution as one wishes.
In more mundane terms, the F/OSS example highlights the costs
of tinkering with doctrines such as presumptions of irreparable harm.
It is costly to gather facts and present them in a form courts will ac-
cept. Declarations may be gathered for purposes of temporary re-
straining orders, but even that takes time and some expense. And for
permanent and even preliminary injunctive relief, depositions will be
taken-and someone has to pay for them. Scholars decry such costs
when they envision downstream users bearing them,' but the point
has no valence. Individual authors bear costs too. For all the attention
paid to the appellate opinion in Jacobsen, when it came time to pay
for the discovery that ultimately led to a liability finding, the costs
were borne by an individual (indeed, a part-time) author."
Giving authors substantial control over their works may produce
great variety in both expression and in the mode of producing it. That
point has been largely lost in academic commentary over the past fif-
teen or twenty years. That commentary tends to romanticize liability
rules (or the no-liability rule of fair use) by juxtaposing archetypal
individual "dissenters" with corporate producers of mainstream
55 See note 44 and accompanying text.
56 Thus Larry Lessig's comment that fair use is no more than the right to hire a lawyer.
See Lawrence Lessig, Re-crafting a Public Domain, 18 Yale J L & Humanities 56, 60 (2006).
So is copyright.
57 In many cases, using the presumption of irreparable harm is likely both to economize on
discovery costs in the near term (at the preliminary injunction stage) and to provide interim
relief that facilitates rapid settlement and thus the avoidance of ordinary discovery later in the
case. Consider Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy against
Patent Threats, 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J 159, 207-09 (2006) (arguing that eBay
will lower the costs of litigation faced by patent infringers because parties asserting patent rights
will not be able to obtain injunctions as frequently). For individual authors who may not have
the money to fund litigation in federal court, these savings may represent the difference between
enforcement of their rights and misappropriation of their work that they are effectively power-
less to stop. The importance of the presumption of irreparable harm extends beyond considera-
tions of judicial efficiency, though those are important.
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works." Though some use F/OSS licensing to maximize profits from
complementary services, many projects simply invert the typical aca-
demic framing of the issue. This inversion is one of the valuable an-
noyances of F/OSS licenses, and it deserves more academic attention
than it has received.
Lest Swift's point be forgotten in this example, the point is not
that copyright plaintiffs have greater interests in freedom or liberty
than copyright defendants. The point is that there is no logical valence
between plaintiffs and defendants in copyright cases with respect to
whatever content one wishes to give those capacious phrases. It is a
mistake to think otherwise. It is common, however, for authors to use
copyright to structure the creation and distribution of expression in
ways that suit their aims and temperaments. That is as true of "main-
stream," "corporate" authors as it is of others. Property rules give au-
thors confidence necessary to create robust social structures of produc-
tion; those structures are more important than the rules but without the
rules those structures may be fragile and easily toppled. F/OSS licensing
makes this point relatively easy to see, but it is not limited to F/OSS
cases. Thus the Tory anarchist may feel keenly how crude and blunt it
can be to base the law of creative expression on property rules without
believing that some mixture of liability rules or legal immunities will
produce "better" results, regardless how those results are measured.
Orwell's critique of Swift should not be forgotten either. Both
property rules and liability rules present hard cases and often seem
crude in their operation. That is just life, not cause for despair. Even
the no-liability rule of fair use has not impoverished the production of
expression, and most scholars write as if just the opposite is obviously
true. Just as importantly, however, and less well acknowledged, prop-
erty rules have not impoverished such production either. And they
seem to me to have a systematic advantage in enabling a variety of
social arrangements aimed at producing expression. Just as a hobbyist
project leader knows better than a judge the temperament of project
members, the stereotypical soulless minions of large corporate produc-
ers of expression know better than judges what makes their structures
work or fail and how their expression affects their users. Empowering
58 There are too many pieces in this vein to provide a comprehensive list. For a representa-
tive sample of works attacking property rules as "Lochnerism," see Cohen, 97 Mich L Rev at
463-67 (cited in note 2). For an example of works embracing the trend away from preliminary
injunctive relief and the seemingly inexhaustibly supply of articles arguing for free speech limita-
tions on copyright law, see Samuelson and Bebenek, 6 1/S: J L & Pol Info Socy at 67-70 (cited in
note 30). For a representative citation, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright's Paradox 10-11
(Oxford 2008).
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authors to experiment with a variety of arrangements is, in my view,
much more likely to enrich our expressive culture than to impoverish
it. The example of F/OSS licensing supports, though admittedly it
does not prove conclusively, that point.
